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creek; and therefore nothing that would justify us in granting our
writ of injunction. All that we can do is to see that the corporate
franchises of the company are not interrupted longer than is absolutely necessary. Injunction refused.
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FALCKE vs. GRAY.
This court will entertain a bill for the specific performance of an agreement to purchase a chattel ; but, if the case made at the hearing shows that the price was
inadequate, and the transaction upon the whole unfair, the bill will be dismissed;
and that, although the court would not have given relief to a party had he sought,
in the same case, to set the agreement aside.

This suit was instituted for the specific performance of a contract
for the sale of two unique china jars, under the following circumstances :-Mrs. Gray, the defendant, wished to let her house, 119
Gloucester-terrace, Hyde-park, and put it into the hands of Messrs.
Boyle & Bryden, house agents, for that purpose. Mr. Falcke, the
plaintiff, saw the house and agreed to take it, having, at the same
time, an option of purchasing certain articles of furniture, such as
a dinner wagon, a table, some chairs, &c., and, amongst those articles, the two jars in question. The plaintiff, the defendant and a
Mr. Brend, clerk to Messrs. Boyle & Bryden, met upon the premises and put a valuation on the articles, fixing that of the jars in
the first instance at 251.; but afterwards it was increased to 401.
Brend, however, admitted that he was really ignorant of the true
value of the jars, upon which a reference as to the true value was
agreed to be made to Messrs. Watson, dealers in articles of virtu, in
Duke street, Manchester square. Plaintiff and Brend then drew up
an agreement, to the effect that the plaintiff should have the option
of purchasing the articles contained in a list appended to the agreement at the prices affixed. The two jars were in the list, and
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marked 401. That agreement was subsequently taken to, and signed
by, Mrs. Gray. After signing that agreement Mrs. Gray went to
the Messrs. Watson, who inspected the jars, and gave her a check
for 2001. for them, and she allowed the Messrs. Watson to take
them away. In her evidence she swore that she asked the Messrs.
Watson whether she would be "acting like a lady" to sell the jars
to them, and they replied that she would. They swore that they
knew nothing of any sale, or contract for the sale, of the jars, previous to their own purchase of them; but that, after they had given
Mrs. Gray the check, they asked her "who had expressed a wish
to purchase the jars ?" She said the plaintiff had; and they
remarked that they knew him, as he was a dealer in the same line
of business as themselves, and they believed he knew the real value
of the jars as well as they did. Mrs. Gray, in her cross-examination, deposed that the Messrs. Watson knew of no sale of the jars
prior to their own purchase of them from her. Upon this state of
facts, the plaintiff filed a bill, and obtained an injunction (ex parte)
against Mrs. Gray, and the Messrs. Watson as her agents, to restrain
the sale of the jars. But the bill was afterwards amended, and it
now came up on motion for a decree, seeking the specific performance by Mrs. Gray of her contract to sell the jars to the plaintiff
for the 401.
Bailey, Q. C., (Waller with him) for the plaintiff, cited Haywood
vs. Cope, 5 Beav. 140.
Glasse, Q. 0. (Jones Bateman with him)'for Mrs. Gray, cited
Coles vs. Trecothick, 9 Yes. 234; Kimberley vs. Jennings, 6 Sim.
340; Fells vs. Read, 3 Yes. 70; Lowther vs. .Lowther, 13 Yes.
95; W]ood vs. Rowcliffe, 2 Phill. 382; Nutbrown vs. Thornton,
10 Yes. 160; Pooley vs. Budd, 14 Beav. 34.
Greene, Q. 0. (Speed with him) for Messrs. Watson, cited TWedgwood vs. Adams, 6 Beav. 600; Day vs. NYewman, 2 Cox, 77;
Doloret vs. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & St. 597; Dunouft vs. Albrecht,
1 Sire. 189; Shaw vs. Fisher, 2 DeG. & Sm. 11 ; Wynne vs.
Price, 3 DeG. & Sm. 310; Underwood vs. Hitchoox, 1 Yes. Sr.
279 ; .Hienvs. Stucely, 1 B. P. 0. 191 ; White vs. Damon, 7 Yes.
30; .Harnett vs. Yielding, 2 Sch. & Lef. 553; Vaughan vs.
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Thomas, 1 B. C. C. 556; Ileateote vs. Paiqnon, 2 B. C. 0. 167.
Bailey, Q. 0., in reply.
The arguments and some minor details of the case sufficiently
appear from the V. O.'s judgment.
The VICE-CHANCELLOR.-The defendant, Mrs. Gray, the occupier of a house in Gloucester-terrace, in January last was desirous
of letting the house furnished. She employed Messrs. Boyle &
Bryden, house agents, to procure her a tenant. The plaintiff, being
in want of a house, went to look at that of Mrs. Gray, and observed
the two jars. He had carried on the business of a dealer in curiosities and old china, and was well acquainted with the value of similar articles. He was struck with the jars, but did not immediately
come to a conclusion as to them. Mrs. Gray was written to; she
came to town, and the plaintiff went to the house and had an interview with her. Mr. Brend, the managing clerk of Messrs. Boyle
& Bryden was there, and there was a discussion as to the terms on
which the house was to be let. The terms were agreed upon, and
it was arranged that the plaintiff should purchase certain articles of
the furniture at a valuation. Some of the articles were ordinary
furniture. Brend valued them, but said he did not know the value
of the jars, and, at the suggestion of Mrs. Gray, named to her
Messrs. Watson, of Duke street, as competent valuers. Some further discussion took place, and Mr. Brend at length, after first valuing the jars at 251., afterwards valued them at 401. An agreement
was then drawn up by Messrs. Boyle & Bryden, and signed by Mrs.
Gray, to the effect that Mr. Falcke should have the option of purchasing the whole or any part of the undermentioned articles at the
sums affixed, viz., sideboards 181. 18s., &c., &c., "and two large
oriental china jars, in drawing-room, 401." These are the facts so
far as they are now materially in controversy. And it also seemed
not disputed that Mrs. Gray, feeling doubtful whether this paice
was a fair price, sent to the defendants, Messrs. Watson, who at
once offered her 2001. for them, and gave her a check for that
amount, and carried the jars away. There was some difference in
the evidence as to how far Messrs. Watson were aware of the previous contract; but the plaintiff now insists that he is entitled to
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specific performance, and has filed his bill praying for it. The defendants insist, in the first place, that this bill cannot be maintained as
being merely one to enforce the sale of a specific chattel. But as
to that, what is the difference, in the eye of the court, between real
and personal estate? There is really no difference; and a contract
as to one is in no different position from a contract as to the other.
I mean, assuming a proper case in both instances to be made out on
which the court can act. If, however, such a case is not made out,
the court refuses performance of any contract, whether relating to
real or personal estate. As Lord Redesdale expresses it,' in ifarnett-vs. Yielding, the difference between a court of equity and a
court of law, in its method of treating the specific performance of
an agreement is this: a couit of law deals with a contract, and
gived such a decree as it is competent to give in consequence of
non-performance, viz., by giving a compensation in the shape of
damages for the non-performance. But a court of equity says, that
is not enough; and in many cases the mere remuneration and compensation in damages is not sufficient satisfaction. Apply that
principle to chattels-and why is it less applicable to them than to
real estate? In ordinary contracts, as for the purchase of ordinary
articles of use and consumption, such as coals, corn or consols, this
court will not decree specific performance. And why? Because
you have only to go into the market and buy another equally good
article, and so can get your compensation. It is not because it is
a chattel, but because you can get adequate compensation for it.
Now, here these articles are of unusual distinction and curiosity, if
not unique; and it is altogether doubtful what price they will fetch.
I am of opinion, therefore, that this is a contract which this court
would enforce; and if the case stood alone upon that ground I
would decree specific performance. But it does not do so. The
next ground of defence is, that this was in fact a hard bargain, on
the ground of the inadequacy of the price between the plaintiff and
Mrs. Gray, and that if she still had the article the court wuuld not
enforce the agreement. The price was 401.-now what was the
value ? These are articles of a very peculiar kind. Their value is
not only fluctuating, but very capricious, depending on the whims
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and wishes of a luxurious community. For any real use they might
be capable of affording to the possessor, I should think 40s.
would be a fair price; but their rarity gives them extreme value.
The value of such things is known to the trade, and there are persons who deal in such articles. The plaintiff admits that they are
worth 1001. to the trade, and as between persons not dealers, 1251.
That is his estimate. But it is of no use to go into this question,
because a dealer has actually given 2001. for them. Therefore the
smallest price must be taken to be 2001. I by no means assume,
however, that that is the whole value; and I cannot help thinking
that Messrs. Watson mean to get a great deal more. But assuming
the value to be 2001., 401. was one-fifth-two-fifths according to the
plaintiff's view. That that was a hard bargain, so far as the price
is concerned, nobody can question. But the plaintiff's counsel,
admitting it to be a hard bargain, still contended that inadequacy
of price was not a sufficient ground for the court to refuse specific performance, and this is, then, the question I have now to consider. The
general rule as to hard bargains is, that the court will not decree
specific performance in such cases, on the ground that after all,
specific performance is a matter of discretion, and is to be used to
advance justice, not to gratify caprice. Lord Eldon, in White vs.
-Damon, observed that this discretion must not be capriciously used,
but only upon settled rules of justice and equity. Lord Langdale,
in Wedgwood vs. Adams, considered that it must depend upon the
circumstances of each case, and that the court only abstained from
giving relief when damages would be awarded at law. I may
observe, with respect to the cases in which the court has refused
specific performance on the ground of its being a hard bargain, that
in many of them in which the court has done so, there were no circumstances of impropriety on the part of the person seeking to
enforce the contract. The cases are not very numerous where
inadequacy of price alone has come into consideration. But I refer
to those in which specific performance has been refused on the
ground of inadequacy of price. Specific performance has been
refused where there was evasion and superior knowledge, and also
the keeping back of information, an element which, it must be
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assumed, does not exist in this case. It was said, however, in the
case to which I refer, that if the bill had been filed to set aside the
contract, there would not have been sufficient ground for it. Lord
Thurlow, in one case, went so far as to say, that if a man went to
purchase an estate, and there was a valuable mine under it, of which
the purchaser knew, but the vendor did not, the court would not set
the contract aside; yet no one can doubt that the court would not
enforce specific performance of such a purchase. There is a wide
difference between the cases where the court is called upon to set
aside an agreement, and those where it is called upon to enforce an
agreement. I do not say that these are all the authorities on the
simple question of inadequacy of price. The next case is peculiar:
.Kien vs. Stukely, where the H. of L. came to no decision. Traughan
vs. Thomas, also, shows the tendency of the court. In Heathote
vs. Paignon,the contract was set aside on the ground of inadequacy.
The case of Day vs. Newman is decisive on the point. In 'White
vs. Damon, the difference was because the sale was by auction.
Now, these two cases appear conclusive; and even if the matter were
res integra, and there were no authority to guide me but those principles which ought to guide every decision of a court of equity, it
appears to me that I ought to refuse specific performance. For the
interference of a court of equity is something which is exceptional;
that is to say, not that it is not of daily occurrence, but it is discretionary, (though the discretion is not arbitrary, but according to
ascertained rules) and is not to be exercised when, in the view of
the court, it would do that which would be unreasonable and shocking to the feelings of mankind. If there were nothing more in the
case than that Mr. Falcke bought of Mrs. Gray property worth
2001. for 401., I think I ought to say, "Bring your action, for I will
not assist you." But it appears to me that in this case there are
circumstances which render it clear that I ought to refuse specific
performance. Was this transaction the case of a seller endeavoring
to get the best price for his commodity, and a buyer endeavoring
to give the smallest? The clear intention of Mrs. Gray was, that
there should be put upon the articles what was a fair and reasonable price ; and though she was told by MNr. Brend that he was not
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a judge of these matters, still she asked his opinion, and he said,
"Suppose we say 401." Mr. Falcke, to do him justice, does not
appear to have pressed the matter; but still Mrs. Gray must be
held to have considered that that was a fair and reasonable valuation. She could not positively tell. She says it was alegacy from
a lady who was reported to have had an offer from George the
Fourth, of 1001. for the jars. But what was'Mr. Falcke's position ?
He says, he knew very well that it was not a reasonable price.
And was this, then, what Mrs. Gray intended? [His honor then
read part of the evidence, showing that Mr. Falcke knew the jars
were worth 1251. at least, and that he did not interfere in the valuation.j Knowing all this, Mr. Falcke allows the contract to be
signed on this footing; and the question is, whether he can come to
the court and say, "Compel Mrs. Gray to perform this contract ?"
This court is not a court of honor, and is not to decide the case
because one'of the parties has not acted as a man of honor ought to
act. I admit that these articles are of fluctuating value, yet still
they have a market value. I admit that I could not set aside this
contract; yet it appears to me that, consistently with justice, I
ought to refuse to interfere to enforce the contract. In doing this
I ought to dismiss this bill without costs as against Mrs. Gray. It
was, indeed, contended that she ought not to have been a party,
and that the bill ought to have been filed against the defendants,
Messrs. Watson, alone. I think that, under the circumstances, the
plaintiff was right in making Mrs. Gray a defendant; but that, as
to Messrs. Watson, it was not proved that Messrs. Watson knew
anything of the previous sale to Mr. Falcke, and that the plaintiff
can have no relief against them. On the whole case, therefore, the
bill must be dismissed without costs against Mrs. Gray, but with
costs against Messrs. Watson.

